Anticipating, Preventing, and Surviving Secondary Boycotts by Schrempf-Stirling, Judith et al.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Management Faculty Publications Management
8-2013
Anticipating, Preventing, and Surviving Secondary
Boycotts
Judith Schrempf-Stirling
University of Richmond, judith.stirling@richmond.edu
Douglas A. Bosse
University of Richmond, dbosse@richmond.edu
Jeffrey S. Harrison
University of Richmond, harrison@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/management-faculty-
publications
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Business Law,
Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Operations and Supply Chain Management Commons,
and the Strategic Management Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Management at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Management Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Schrempf-Stirling, Judith; Bosse, Douglas A.; and Harrison, Jeffrey S., "Anticipating, Preventing, and Surviving Secondary Boycotts"
(2013). Management Faculty Publications. 35.
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/management-faculty-publications/35
  1
	
		
ANTICIPATING,	PREVENTING	AND	SURVIVING	SECONDARY	BOYCOTTS			
	
	
	
	
	
Judith	Schrempf	
Robins	School	of	Business	
University	of	Richmond	
Richmond,	VA	23173,	USA	
(804)	287‐6309	
jschremp@richmond.edu	
	
Douglas	A.	Bosse	
Robins	School	of	Business	
University	of	Richmond	
Richmond,	VA	23173,	USA	
(804)	287‐1922	
dbosse@richmond.edu	
	
Jeffrey	S.	Harrison	
Robins	School	of	Business	
University	of	Richmond	
Richmond,	VA	23173,	USA	
(804)	380‐9000	
harrison@richmond.edu	
Corresponding	Author	
	
  2
	
	
ANTICIPATING,	PREVENTING	AND	SURVIVING	SECONDARY	BOYCOTTS	
	
	
ABSTRACT	
Even	the	best	stakeholder‐managed	firms	can	suffer	when	they	become	the	targets	of	a	
secondary	boycott,	as	recent	headlines	attest.	A	secondary	boycott	is	a	group’s	refusal	to	
engage	a	target	firm	with	which	the	group	has	no	direct	dispute	in	an	attempt	to	sway	
public	opinion,	draw	attention	to	an	issue,	or	influence	the	actions	of	a	disputant.	This	
article	provides	a	new	perspective	and	tools	for	both	scholars	and	managers	concerned	
with	this	phenomenon.	Building	on	a	stakeholder	theory	foundation,	we	examine	possible	
actions	managers	can	take	to	avoid	being	surprised	by	a	secondary	boycott,	propose	
conditions	that	raise	the	probability	of	becoming	the	target	of	a	secondary	boycott,	and	
develop	four	alternative	approaches	for	managing	stakeholder	relationships	in	a	world	of	
secondary	boycotts,	consistent	with	the	underlying	stakeholder	culture	of	the	firm.		
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TARGET	CORP.	UNDER	FIRE	
Minnesota‐based	retailer	Target	Corp.	is	a	$70	billion	company	recognized	for	being	
a	good	corporate	citizen	with	respectful	stakeholder	engagement	practices.	The	firm	is	
known	by	consumers	for	providing	fashion	at	low	prices,	works	with	its	suppliers	to	ensure	
that	the	products	sold	in	its	stores	are	produced	responsibly,	and	spends	five	percent	of	
income	to	support	community	grants	and	programs.	The	company’s	efforts	are	
acknowledged	by	third	parties	on	lists	such	as	“100	Best	Corporate	Citizens”	(Corporate	
Responsibility	Magazine)	and	“Top	50	Companies	for	Diversity”	(DiversityInc	magazine).	
Ethisphere	Institute	names	Target	one	of	the	most	ethical	companies	worldwide.	
However,	in	spite	of	the	effort	and	resources	Target	invests	in	satisfying	its	
stakeholders,	the	company	suffered	recently	as	a	result	of	damaging	stakeholder	dynamics.	
Target	donated	$150,000	to	a	pro‐business	group	that	supported	Minnesota	governor	
candidate	Tom	Emmer.	Unfortunately	for	Target,	this	ordinary	donation	turned	into	a	
costly	problem.	Several	Minnesota‐based	civil	society	organizations	(CSOs)	(especially	gay	
and	lesbian	groups)	vehemently	opposed	Emmer’s	candidacy	because	of	his	conservative	
stance	on	gay	and	lesbian	rights.	Given	Target’s	diversity	policies	and	activities	that	include	
benefits	for	domestic	partners	and	the	sponsorship	of	local	gay	events	such	as	the	Out	&	
Equal	Workplace	Summit,	local	gay	and	lesbian	groups	were	especially	confused	by	the	
company’s	support	of	Emmer.	The	CSOs	responded	by	mobilizing	Target’s	workers	to	raise	
their	voice,	informed	the	company’s	customers	about	its	support	of	a	political	candidate	
who	is	on	the	other	side	of	the	issue,	and	encouraged	them	to	boycott	Target,	with	the	
intent	to	ultimately	hurt	Emmer’s	campaign	(Birkey,	2010).		
  4
Target	was	a	victim	of	a	secondary	boycott.	Whereas	a	(primary)	boycott	is	a	
group’s	refusal	to	engage	with	a	target	firm	that	is	acting	in	ways	that	are	offensive	to	the	
group,	a	secondary	boycott	is	a	group’s	refusal	to	engage	a	target	firm	with	which	the	group	
has	no	direct	dispute	in	an	attempt	to	sway	public	opinion,	draw	attention	to	an	issue,	or	
influence	the	actions	of	a	disputant.	Instead	of	pressuring	candidate	Emmer	directly,	the	
CSOs	exploited	their	influence	over	Target’s	primary	stakeholders	to	make	their	voices	
heard.	Target	CEO	Gregg	Steinhafel	issued	an	apology	for	the	company’s	involvement,	
stating	that	although	he	is	pro‐business,	he	did	not	anticipate	that	the	donation	would	
disappoint	Target’s	team	members	or	customers.	Emmer	lost	the	election.	
Even	more	recently,	at	the	beginning	of	2012,	J.	C.	Penney	faced	a	secondary	boycott	
by	anti‐gay	groups.	J.	C.	Penney	had	recently	hired	the	comedian	Ellen	DeGeneres	because	
of	her	popularity	and	her	image	as	a	person	people	trust.		DeGeneres	is	also	openly	lesbian	
and	a	strong	advocate	for	gay	rights.	Anti‐gay	groups	called	for	a	boycott	of	J.C.	Penney	
until	the	company	ends	its	relationship	with	DeGeneres.	The	outrage	about	DeGeneres’	
pro‐gay	attitude	surprised	J.C.	Penney	(Bruni,	2012).		
Target	and	J.C.	Penney	are	generally	recognized	as	role	models	for	their	successful	
stakeholder	management.	Stakeholder	theory	states	that	good	stakeholder	management	
can	be	a	source	of	above‐normal	performance	and	competitive	advantage	(Freeman,	1984).	
Some	companies,	however,	seem	to	consider	their	stakeholders’	needs	carefully,	but	still	
suffer	performance	problems	as	a	result	of	secondary	boycotts.	The	objectives	of	this	
article	are	to	extend	stakeholder	theory	to	increase	our	understanding	of	secondary	
boycotts	and	to	provide	managers	with	insights	about	how	they	can	protect	their	firms	
against	them.	
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Our	approach	involves	expanding	stakeholder	theory	by	proposing	a	supplemental	
perspective:	in	addition	to	the	needs	and	interests	of	primary	stakeholders	such	as	
customers,	suppliers	and	employees,	firms	should	consider	the	societal	issues	that	are	of	
concern	to	those	stakeholders.	That	is,	societal	issues	have	stakeholders,	too,	and	to	the	
extent	that	a	firm’s	primary	stakeholders	are	also	stakeholders	to	a	societal	issue,	the	firm	
needs	to	be	sensitive	to	those	issues	as	well.	To	supplement	the	standard	stakeholder	map	
that	puts	the	firm	in	the	center	surrounded	by	stakeholders,	we	propose	an	issue‐focused	
stakeholder	map	with	issues	in	the	center.	Many	issue‐driven	groups	(especially	CSOs)	
have	a	surprising	amount	of	influence	on	firms	when	they	use	a	secondary	boycott	strategy	
to	affect	change.	They	can	focus	on	an	issue	and	approach	any	stakeholder	who	is	directly	
or	indirectly	connected	to	the	issue	that	they	are	fighting	for	(or	against).	An	issue‐focused	
stakeholder	map	helps	corporations	become	aware	of	societal	issues	and	their	connections	
to	them.		
Based	on	this	novel	perspective,	we	examine	steps	managers	can	take	to	prevent	
being	surprised	by	a	secondary	boycott.	This	discussion	leads	to	factors	that	raise	the	
probability	a	firm	will	become	a	target	of	a	secondary	boycott.	Finally,	we	discuss	
alternative	approaches	for	managing	stakeholder	relationships	in	a	world	of	secondary	
boycotts.		
WHAT	STAKEHOLDER	THEORY	SAYS	
Stakeholder	theory	originated	as	a	theory	of	competitive	advantage	with	a	moral	
foundation	(Freeman,	1984).	A	stakeholder	is	any	actor	with	an	interest	in	the	activities	
and	outcomes	of	an	organization	and	upon	whom	the	organization	depends	to	achieve	its	
own	purposes.	A	general	proposition	of	stakeholder	theory	is	that	firms	that	better	serve	
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the	needs	and	interests	of	their	various	stakeholders	will,	in	turn,	be	better	served	by	those	
stakeholders.	This	exchange	of	consideration	is	reflected	in	the	roles	played	by	strategic	
and	moral	stakeholders	(Goodpastor,	1991).	Strategic	stakeholders	are	those	who	affect	
the	achievement	of	a	firm’s	objectives.	Hence,	it	is	of	strategic	importance	for	the	firm	to	
manage	those	stakeholder	relationships	to	(at	least)	avoid	any	negative	economic	
consequences.	Moral	stakeholders,	on	the	other	hand,	are	those	affected	by	a	firm’s	
activities.	Whether	a	firm’s	activities	have	a	positive	or	negative	affect	on	another	actor,	
and	whether	those	affects	are	intended	or	unintended,	the	firm	has	moral	responsibility	for	
its	actions.			
It	is	unrealistic	and	impractical,	however,	to	suggest	that	managers	are	responsible	
to	all	the	actors	their	firm	could	possibly	affect	in	any	way.	Consequently,	various	
perspectives	have	been	developed	to	assist	in	determining	which	stakeholders	are	or	
should	be	most	salient	to	managers	as	they	establish	strategic	priorities	and	make	
important	decisions.	One	of	the	most	widely	accepted	perspectives	argues	that	firms	give	
priority	to	stakeholders	which	posses	one,	two	or	all	of	the	following	characteristics:	power	
(influence	on	the	firm’s	ability	to	achieve	desired	outcomes),	legitimacy	(socially	accepted	
relationship	to	the	firm),	and	urgency	(time	sensitivity	of	the	stakeholder’s	claim)(Mitchell,	
Agle,	and	Wood,	1997).		
Another	perspective,	based	on	the	principle	of	fairness,	suggests	that	managers	
should	pay	particular	attention	to	the	needs	of	stakeholders	from	whom	they	have	
voluntarily	received	resources	(Phillips,	2003).	Either	of	these	perspectives	leads	to	the	
identification	of	a	firm’s	“primary”	stakeholders,	and	a	typical	stakeholder	map	looks	
something	like	Figure	1,	where	primary	external	stakeholders	would	include	customers,	
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business	partners,	communities,	and	suppliers	of	raw	materials,	technology,	financing	and	
other	key	resources.	These	stakeholders	might	also	be	considered	primary	because	they	
are	a	part	of	the	firm’s	production	core.	Employees	and	owners	are	also	stakeholders,	and	
would	be	classified	inside	the	firm	in	Figure	1.	
										(Insert	Figure	1	about	here)	
	
Stakeholders	possess	economic	power	to	the	extent	that	a	firm	depends	on	them	to	
supply	financial	or	other	resources.	However,	another	source	of	power	is	what	might	be	
called	an	influencer	stake	(Frooman,	1999;	Freeman,	1984).	Stakeholders	that	only	possess	
this	type	of	power	are	considered	secondary	stakeholders	and,	although	they	may	not	be	
given	the	same	priority	in	decisions	as	primary	stakeholders,	firms	that	neglect	them	do	so	
at	their	peril.	They	are	not	a	part	of	the	production	core	nor	do	they	provide	physical	
resources	the	firm	needs,	but	they	have	the	ability	to	affect	firm	outcomes	and	they	use	this	
power	to	attempt	to	influence	firm	decisions.	CSOs	fall	into	this	category.		
The	existence,	and	importance,	of	secondary	stakeholders	is	one	reason	that	a	pure	
utilitarian	approach	to	stakeholder	management	is	impractical.	Establishing	as	a	primary	
firm	objective	the	creation	of	the	greatest	happiness	for	the	greatest	number	of	people	
(Bentham,	1776)	means	that	minority	groups	with	small	numbers	are	likely	to	be	neglected	
and	could	actually	be	hurt	by	the	actions	of	the	firm.	However,	according	to	stakeholder	
theory,	these	minority	groups	can	have	a	meaningful	impact	on	a	firm’s	ability	to	achieve	
its	business	objectives.	
Traditional	stakeholder	theory,	then,	provides	a	foundation	for	considering	societal	
issues	as	represented	by	CSOs.	First,	from	an	instrumental	perspective,	a	CSO	can	hurt	the	
firm’s	progress	towards	its	objectives.	Second,	a	firm	that	genuinely	considers	the	well	
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being	of	its	primary	stakeholders	should	be	concerned	about	those	things	that	matter	to	
them.	Finally,	stakeholder	theory	suggests	that	a	firm	should	establish	a	well‐defined	set	of	
values	and	should	work	to	ensure	that	those	values	are	demonstrated	through	its	decisions	
and	actions	(Freeman	and	Gilbert,	1988;	Jones,	Felps,	and	Bigley,	2007).	
EVOLUTION	OF	STAKEHOLDER	DEMANDS:	TOWARDS	SECONDARY	BOYCOTTS	
Primary	stakeholders,	in	their	normal	interactions	with	firms,	evaluate	their	
perceptions	of	the	firm	based	on	their	expectations	for	justice	and	fairness	(Bosse,	Phillips,	
and	Harrison,	2009).	When	they	perceive	they	are	being	treated	better	than	expected,	they	
positively	reciprocate	towards	the	firm.	On	the	other	hand,	when	they	feel	unfairly	treated	
or	negatively	affected	they	seek	to	improve	their	situation.	Examples	include	employee	
demands	for	a	safe	working	place	or	higher	salaries,	supplier	demands	for	more	favorable	
contract	terms,	or	demands	by	local	communities	to	take	responsibility	for	environmental	
degradation	(Human	Rights	Watch,	1995).		
One	very	powerful	tool	stakeholders	have	to	influence	firms	is	a	boycott,	which	is	an	
“attempt	by	one	or	more	parties	to	achieve	certain	objectives”	by	refusing	to	purchase	
products	or	services	from	a	target	firm	(Friedman,	1985:	97).	Friedman	(1999)	
distinguishes	four	kinds	of	boycotts.	An	instrumental	boycott	aims	at	changing	a	specific	
policy	or	action	of	the	target	firm.	A	catalytic	boycott	aims	at	raising	awareness	about	a	
company’s	activity	or	policy.	The	boycott,	here,	is	a	publicity	tool.	An	expressive	boycott	
aims	at	generally	expressing	one’s	displeasure	about	the	target,	though	the	intended	
outcome	can	be	rather	vague.	A	punitive	boycott	aims	at	punishing	the	target	for	its	
behavior.	The	ultimate	goal	is	to	cause	harm	to	the	target	irrespective	of	whether	the	
company	would	be	willing	to	change	or	cooperate.	
  9
Stakeholder	demands	towards	corporations	have	evolved	considerably	from	a	
narrow	focus	on	issues	directly	related	to	the	stakeholder‐firm	relationship	to	a	broad	
focus	on	issues	within	the	corporate	sphere	of	influence	(Schrempf,	2012).	Since	the	mid	
1990s,	self‐declaring	stakeholders	have	started	to	approach	corporations	on	behalf	of	
corporations’	primary	stakeholders.	CSOs,	for	example,	make	large	Western	corporations	
responsible	for	the	bad	working	conditions	in	their	contractors’	independent	offshore	
factories	–	the	so‐called	sweatshop	problematic	(Petersen,	1992;	The	National	Labor	
Committee,	1995;	Sethi,	2003).	The	CSO	community	perceived	the	corporate	search	for	
higher	profit	margins	as	a	key	component	for	bad	working	conditions	in	supplier	factories	
(such	as	below	minimum	wages	and	unsafe	working	environments).	The	sweatshop	debate	
of	the	1990s	(Petersen,	1992;	Sluiter,	2009)	or	the	more	recent	debate	about	conflict	
minerals	(Steinweg	et	al.,	2007)	are	examples	of	this	extension.		
Even	though	the	term	was	not	widely	used	to	describe	it,	the	sweatshop	controversy	
of	the	1990s	was	a	secondary	boycott.	It	was	not	employees	who	demanded	better	contract	
terms	from	their	employer	(the	supplier).	Instead,	international	CSOs	spoke	on	behalf	of	
those	primary	stakeholders	and	initiated	boycotts	against	the	suppliers’	customers	such	as	
Nike	or	The	Gap	to	pressure	these	companies	to	improve	working	conditions	along	their	
supply	chain	(Schrempf,	2012;	Sluiter,	2009).		
The	Target	example	from	the	introduction	shows	that	stakeholder	demands	have	
broadened	even	further.	As	in	the	sweatshop	debate,	secondary	stakeholders	approach	a	
company.	This	time,	however,	they	base	their	demands	towards	the	corporation	on	a	
relatively	loose	connection	between	the	corporation	and	the	issue.	Until	gay	groups	
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approached	Target,	the	firm	had	probably	never	imagined	that	gay	rights	might	be	
something	that	would	embroil	the	firm.		
Secondary	boycotts	of	advertisers	are	also	becoming	more	common.	A	firm	that	
places	an	ad	on	a	radio	talk	show,	for	example,	does	so	because	its	strategy	involves	
marketing	to	the	same	demographic	that	listens	to	that	show.	The	firm	does	not	expect	to	
control	the	content	of	such	a	show,	so	it	can	be	surprised	when	the	public	holds	it	
accountable	for	positions	taken	by	the	talk	show	host.		In	early	2012	millions	of	consumers	
used	online	social	media	to	organize	a	secondary	boycott	of	advertisers	on	radio	host	Rush	
Limbaugh’s	show	because	they	were	offended	by	his	inflammatory	treatment	of	a	pro	
birth‐control	advocate	named	Sandra	Fluke.	Some	of	the	advertisers	suffered	significant	
revenue	losses	even	though	the	boycotters’	dispute	was	not	with	them,	but	with	Limbaugh.	
The	secondary	boycott	worked;	Limbaugh	was	forced	to	apologize	for	his	commentary	in	
order	to	stem	the	loss	of	advertisers	from	his	show.		
While	these	examples	of	secondary	boycotts	may	appear	similar,	there	are	
important	differences.	Contrast	the	Target	and	Nike	cases:	Nike’s	actions	(increased	profit	
margins	through	outsourcing)	contributed	to	the	continuity	of	sweatshops	while	Target’s	
campaign	contribution	did	not	contribute	to	candidate	Emmer’s	anti‐gay	position.	Emmer’s	
agenda	towards	gay	and	lesbian	rights	was	independent	of	Target’s	business	activities.	This	
cannot	be	said	for	the	Nike	case.	These	contrasts	illustrate	that	managers	need	to	be	aware	
of	how	vulnerable	their	business	can	be	to	secondary	boycotts.	Even	if	corporate	activities	
do	not	directly	advance	any	specific	harmful	or	criticized	issue	(e.g.,	sweatshops,	child	
labor),	corporations	might	become	subjects	of	secondary	boycotts.	
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Furthermore,	although	secondary	boycotts	may	seem	unfair,	especially	to	their	
targets,	and	although	they	are	certainly	capable	of	causing	material	damage,	the	law	is	
unlikely	to	provide	much	protection.	In	fact,	a	2010	U.S.	Supreme	Court	ruling	is	one	
indication	that	the	law	may	be	moving	in	the	other	direction.	In	their	ruling	on	the	case	of	
Citizens	United	vs.	Federal	Election	Commission,	the	Supreme	Court	overturned	a	previous	
decision	against	Citizens	United,	a	conservative	non‐profit	organization	(Sachs,	2012).	
Citizens	United	was	prohibited	by	a	lower	court	from	advertising	or	paying	to	show	a	film	
that	was	damaging	to	Hillary	Clinton,	a	presidential	hopeful,	within	30	days	of	the	
Democratic	Primaries.	The	lower	court	decision	was	based	on	the	2002	Bipartisan	
Campaign	Reform	Act	(McCain‐Feingold	Act)	that	restricted	corporations	or	unions	from	
supporting	an	“electioneering	communication”	just	prior	to	primaries	or	general	elections.	
In	overturning	the	ruling,	the	Supreme	Court	argued	that	this	was	a	violation	of	the	First	
Amendment	regarding	free	speech.	President	Obama	harshly	criticized	the	ruling,	saying	it	
would	create	“a	stampede	of	special‐interest	money	in	our	politics	(Smith,	2011:	A15).”	
The	Citizens	United	ruling	seems	to	establish	a	precedent	for	allowing	CSOs	latitude	
in	pressuring	political	candidates	through	a	variety	of	means,	as	in	the	case	of	candidate	
Emmer.	The	ruling	might	also	be	interpreted	as	moving	the	legal	pendulum	in	the	direction	
of	protecting	the	rights	of	groups	to	speak	freely	against	other	entities,	such	as	
corporations.		
A	DIFFERENT	PERSPECTIVE:	FROM	STAKEHOLDER	MAPPING	TO	ISSUE	MAPPING	
Several	years	ago,	the	British	utility	firm	United	Utilities	became	the	target	of	a	
secondary	boycott.	One	of	its	managers	summarized	his	experience	as	follows:		
“As	a	water	utility	we	are	a	major	landowner.	We	have	been	approached	by	
representatives	from	the	anti‐hunting	league	and	asked	to	stop	renting	out	a	parcel	
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of	land	for	use	by	sports‐hunters.	To	be	honest,	we	don’t	particularly	have	a	
corporate	view	on	hunting,	and	do	not	particularly	want	to	have	one.	Where	does	
this	all	end?	If	there	is	a	church	but	no	mosque	on	our	land,	will	we	eventually	have	
to	have	a	view	on	God?	(Zadek,	2001:	156).”	
	
If	asked,	Target	managers	would	probably	report	their	Emmer	experience	in	a	
similar	way.	What	tools	are	available	to	managers	to	help	them	better	understand	these	
sorts	of	issues?	Stakeholder	theory	traditionally	puts	the	corporation	in	the	center	of	a	
stakeholder	map	(Figure	1).	Werhane	(1999),	however,	suggests	putting	a	stakeholder	in	
the	center	of	a	stakeholder	map.	The	advantage	of	this	perspective	change	is	that	it	can	help	
determine	the	stakeholder’s	obligations	towards	the	focal	corporation	(Phillips,	2003).	This	
“moral	imagination”	helps	the	corporation	in	anticipating	stakeholders’	demands	and	
expectations	(Werhane,	1999;	Frooman,	1999).		
Extending	this	idea,	we	propose	putting	a	societal	issue	in	the	center	of	a	map,	
where	CSOs	serve	as	representatives	of	that	issue	(see	Figure	2).	Such	a	map	is	consistent	
with	the	perspective	of	CSOs.	They	are	founded	for	a	cause	(e.g.,	fight	child	labor	or	protect	
human	rights	worldwide),	and	they	focus	on	which	actors	are	directly	(primary	
stakeholder)	or	indirectly	(secondary	stakeholder)	connected	to	that	cause.		
(Insert	Figure	2	about	here)			
	
An	issue‐focused	stakeholder	map	is	beneficial	to	the	corporation	for	several	
reasons.	First,	this	perspective	can	help	corporations	to	flag	societal	issues	that	would	fall	
under	the	table	using	a	traditional	stakeholder	map	due	to	the	focus	on	primary	
stakeholder	relationships.	Second,	an	issue‐focused	stakeholder	map	provides	
corporations	with	a	better	overview	of	how	far	they	are	actually	connected	to	some	of	the	
most	pressing	societal	issues	of	the	time.	This	connection	indicates	a	corporation’s	
vulnerability	to	secondary	boycotts,	but	also	a	corporation’s	ability	to	contribute	to	a	
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solution	of	societal	issues.	Third,	an	issue‐focused	stakeholder	map	helps	expand	the	
classic	stakeholder	questions	such	as	“who	is	our	stakeholder”	or	“how	many	resources	
should	we	dedicate	to	each	stakeholder	group”	(Harrison	&	Bosse,	forthcoming)	to	new	
questions	such	as	“what	are	the	most	pressing	issues	in	our	society	today	and	how	are	we	
connected”	or	“how	can	we	contribute	to	solve	societal	issues”.	Finally,	an	issue‐focused	
stakeholder	map	offers	a	more	balanced	(neutral)	perspective	that	all	stakeholders	
(including	the	focal	corporation	but	also	initiators	of	secondary	boycotts)	can	share.	This	
perspective	is	useful	for	corporations	to	understand	the	reasoning	of	initiators	of	
secondary	boycotts	that	might	target	them.		
We	suggest	managers	do	four	things	to	derive	practical	value	from	this	new	
perspective.		
 Step	one:	Keep	a	short	list	of	topical	issues.	While	some	societal	issues	are	
perpetually	topical	(e.g.,	various	human	rights),	others	make	headlines	for	a	
comparatively	short	time	(e.g.,	federally	mandated	healthcare	in	the	U.S.).		
 Step	two:	Discuss	and	decide	whether	the	firm	wants	to	take	a	stand	on	each	of	the	
issues	on	the	short	list.		
 Step	three:	Consider	how	managerial	decisions	(e.g.,	funding	a	politician,	
outsourcing	production,	etc.)	will	likely	be	perceived	by	the	stakeholders	of	each	
topical	issue.	Target	was	negatively	influenced	by	an	issue	(gay	rights)	that	it	had	
already	decided	to	support.	
 Step	four:	Be	prepared	to	react	to	secondary	boycotts	quickly	to	effectively	signal	
the	firm’s	stance	–	or	intended	distance	–	on	the	issue.	The	key	factor	here	is	
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whether	the	firm	has	a	primary	stakeholder	that	is	also	a	primary	stakeholder	of	the	
societal	issue.	Figure	3	depicts	the	situation	in	general	terms.		
(Insert	Figure	3	about	here)	
As	discussed	in	the	next	section,	it	is	crucial	for	corporations	to	know	their	“enemy”,	
i.e.	to	understand	how	distant	stakeholders	choose	their	secondary	boycott	targets.		
KNOW	YOUR	ENEMY	
The	secondary	boycotts	examples	discussed	thus	far	provide	us	with	some	
information	about	how	CSOs	or	other	secondary	stakeholder	groups	select	their	boycott	
targets.	We	present	three	criteria	here	that	will	be	useful	for	managers:	corporate	power,	
benefitting	from	harm/issue,	and	the	corporation’s	CSR	reputation.	Frooman	(1999)	
developed	stakeholder	influence	strategies	that	are	similar	to	what	we	develop	below,	but	
our	emphasis	is	on	the	inverse	direction	of	influence.		
Corporate	Power	
	 An	obvious	criterion	for	how	a	group	selects	its	boycott	target	might	simply	be	the	
powerful	position	of	the	prospective	target	company.	Power,	here,	can	be	interpreted	in	
several	ways:	First,	power	might	refer	to	a	corporation’s	independence	from	the	primary	
stakeholder	it	shares	with	the	issue.	This	enables	the	targeted	company	to	easily	cease	any	
relationship	with	the	stakeholder.	Depending	on	the	issue,	ending	a	business	relationship	
with	a	primary	stakeholder	might	already	be	enough	to	improve	the	situation.	For	instance,	
it	might	be	that	there	are	numerous	groups	that	would	be	happy	to	rent	United	Utilities’	
land.	So,	the	company	might	not	be	dependent	on	renting	its	land	to	the	hunting	group.	
Hence,	United	Utilities	is	powerful	in	that	it	can	simply	switch	its	primary	stakeholders.	
This	of	course,	might	make	it	easy	for	the	target	company	to	make	the	boycott	go	away.	It	
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simply	washes	its	hands	clean	by	cutting	any	relationship	with	the	“troublemaker”	
stakeholder.		
Second,	power	can	refer	to	the	corporation’s	ability	to	affect	change	at	its	primary	
stakeholder.	Here,	power	can	be	interpreted	as	influence	that	the	firm	has	over	its	primary	
stakeholder’s	activities.	Again,	a	company’s	influence	over	its	primary	stakeholder	can	be	
high	if	the	company’s	primary	stakeholder	is	dependent	on	the	company.	In	this	case,	there	
might	be	a	higher	chance	that	the	company	can	pressure	the	primary	stakeholder	to	change	
its	behavior	or	position	by	threatening	it	to	end	their	business	relationship.	Staying	with	
the	United	Utilities	case,	if	United	Utilities	is	the	only	opportunity	for	the	hunting	group	to	
hunt,	then	United	Utilities	has	an	enormous	power	and	might	be	the	only	actor	who	is	able	
to	stop	that	particular	hunting	group	from	hunting.	Or,	United	Utilities	might	at	least	be	in	a	
position	to	find	a	compromise	such	as	hunting	only	a	certain	amount	of	a	specific	animal.	
Finally,	power	can	also	be	interpreted	as	a	company’s	ability	to	foster	joint	action.	
When	CSOs	started	criticizing	corporations’	outsourcing	practices	and	the	consequences	on	
working	conditions,	CSOs	first	targeted	the	leaders	in	the	different	industries	to	pressure	
them	to	improve	working	conditions,	hoping	that	this	induces	other	companies	in	the	
industry	to	do	the	same.	Once	the	initial	target	companies	have	improved,	the	activists	
switch	their	emphasis	to	the	next	tranche	of	companies	they	seek	to	change	(Connor,	
2002).		
This	logic	can	also	be	found	in	recent	secondary	boycott	examples.	Gay	groups	
probably	approached	Target	because	they	perceived	the	company	as	a	powerful	
corporation	and	envisioned	that	if	Target	stops	its	support	of	candidate	Emmer,	then	this	
might	create	a	snowball	effect	that	other	corporations	might	follow.	This,	then,	could	
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(hypothetically)	encourage	Emmer	(and	his	party)	to	put	the	gay	rights	debate	aside	or	
even	change	his	position.		
From	this	discussion,	the	following	three	factors	can	help	managers	to	evaluate	the	
risk	of	becoming	a	secondary	boycott	target:	
1.	If	a	corporation	is	not	dependent	on	the	primary	stakeholder	it	shares	with	the	issue,	
the	corporation	is	less	likely	to	become	a	secondary	boycott	target.	
2.	If	the	primary	stakeholder	a	corporation	shares	with	the	issue	is	dependent	on	the	
corporation,	the	corporation	is	more	likely	to	become	a	secondary	boycott	target.	
3.	If	a	corporation	can	function	as	a	role	model	by	inspiring	other	stakeholders	to	
pressure	the	primary	stakeholder	to	change,	then	the	corporation	is	more	likely	to	
become	a	secondary	boycott	target.	
Dirty	Hands	
While	the	secondary	boycott	examples	discussed	so	far	show	that	stakeholder	
groups	target	powerful	corporations,	the	United	Utilities	case	illustrates	a	further	criterion	
that	induces	stakeholders	to	launch	a	boycott.	Secondary	boycotters	may	target	
corporations	that	benefit	from	the	shared	primary	stakeholder’s	position	on	the	issue.		
United	Utilities	financially	benefitted	from	renting	out	land	to	the	hunting	group	even	
though	land	rental	is	not	actually	the	company’s	core	business.	In	the	eyes	of	the	anti‐
hunting	groups,	however,	the	British	company	made	its	hands	dirty	by	accepting	dirty	
money	from	hunting	groups.	The	Target	and	J.C.	Penney	examples	are	slightly	different,	as	
the	two	companies	did	not	intend	to	benefit	from	the	anti‐gay	and	pro‐gay	positions	of	
Emmer	and	DeGeneres,	respectively.	Instead,	Target	probably	assumed	that	it	would	be	
strategically	beneficial	to	support	the	pro‐business	politician	Emmer.	J.	C.	Penney	chose	
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DeGeneres	because	of	her	popularity	and	reputation	as	a	person	consumers	trust.	So,	in	the	
eyes	of	the	stakeholder	groups	that	initiated	secondary	boycotts	against	those	firms,	their	
motivation	was	different	compared	to	the	anti‐hunting	case.		
Corporations,	then,	should	be	aware	of	the	potential	to	face	a	secondary	boycott	if	
they	benefit	from	controversial	(according	to	the	point	of	view	of	secondary	stakeholders)	
activities	or	positions	of	their	own	primary	stakeholders	as	summarized	in	the	following	
factor.	
4.		If	a	corporation	benefits	(financially	or	non‐financially)	from	the	controversial	
activities	of	the	primary	stakeholder	it	shares	with	the	issue,	then	the	corporation	is	
more	likely	to	become	a	secondary	boycott	target.		
CSR	Reputation	
	 While	being	powerful	or	benefitting	from	controversial	stakeholder	relationships	
are	already	good	indicators	for	becoming	a	secondary	boycott	target,	a	third	indicator	is	
worth	considering:	a	good	CSR	reputation.	Corporations	with	a	positive	CSR	reputation	
might	perceive	themselves	as	being	less	likely	to	become	boycott	targets,	but	this	
represents	a	sense	of	false	security.	As	discussed	at	the	beginning	of	the	article,	Target	has	
a	good	CSR	reputation.	OutFront	Minnesota,	one	of	the	gay	groups	that	launched	the	
secondary	boycott	against	Target	considers	the	company	as	a	“strong	ally”	of	the	Minnesota	
gay	community	and	“a	model	of	the	corporate	support	for	diversity”	(OutFront,	2010).	
Target’s	strong	reputation	became	the	company’s	undoing	as	its	support	for	candidate	
Emmer	was	inconsistent	with	the	company’s	diversity	reputation.	Hence,	a	good	CSR	
reputation	is	not	a	guarantee	to	be	spared	from	secondary	boycott	calls.	On	the	contrary,	a	
good	CSR	reputation	might	make	corporations	more	vulnerable	to	boycotts	as	the	smallest	
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inconsistency	can	be	enough	to	question	the	corporation’s	authenticity.	A	company	with	a	
good	CSR	reputation	might	also	be	more	responsive	to	boycotts	and	public	outcry	since	its	
reputation	and	credibility	are	on	the	line.	So,	stakeholder	groups	might	especially	choose	
corporations	with	a	strong	CSR	reputation	for	boycott	targets	as	they	expect	a	higher	
positive	response	rate.	This	CSR	reputation	discussion	leads	us	to	a	final	factor	managers	
should	consider	when	assessing	the	potential	for	a	secondary	boycott:	
5.		If	a	corporation	is	known	as	a	good	corporate	citizen,	it	is	more	likely	to	become	a	
secondary	boycott	target	if	its	primary	stakeholder’s	offense	is	inconsistent	with	the	
corporation’s	CSR	reputation.	
MANAGING	SECONDARY	BOYCOTTS	AS	A	TARGETTED	CORPORATION	
The	previous	section	provided	information	about	how	a	distant	stakeholder	group	
might	identify	its	boycott	targets.	This	is	helpful	for	managers	to	assess	their	company’s	
risk	of	becoming	a	boycott	target	by	secondary	stakeholders.	Equally	relevant	for	a	
manager	is	how	to	avoid	becoming	a	target	of	secondary	boycotts	and	how	to	deal	with	an	
actual	secondary	boycott.	We	outline	four	general	approaches	firms	might	use	in	
attempting	to	avoid	secondary	boycotts	or,	if	faced	with	one,	how	they	might	respond.	On	
one	end	of	the	spectrum	is	the	“business	as	usual”	attitude,	i.e.	do	nothing,	while	at	the	
other	end	of	the	spectrum	is	a	collaboration	with	other	stakeholders	to	find	long‐term	
solutions.	We	elaborate	on	how	each	of	the	approaches	is	consistent	with	specific	
stakeholder	cultures	(Jones	et	al.	2007)	and	on	the	likely	success	of	each	of	the	approaches.		
Egoist:	Business	As	Usual	
	 The	first	option	for	corporations	is	to	do	nothing	special	regarding	the	potential	
threat	of	a	secondary	boycott.	With	this	approach,	the	corporation	continues	to	rely	on	a	
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focus	on	its	primary	stakeholders	in	the	belief	that	a	proper	management	of	primary	
stakeholders	is	enough	to	create	and	protect	firm	value.	Any	additional	investment	in	
examining	the	constantly	changing	range	of	issues	that	might	share	a	primary	stakeholder	
and	the	related	potential	of	secondary	boycotts	is	perceived	as	too	time	and	resource	
consuming.	This	attitude	corresponds	to	what	Jones	et	al.	(2007)	refer	to	as	an	egoist	
stakeholder	culture.	Such	a	culture	focuses	on	the	company’s	short‐term	economic	success.		
	 While	doing	nothing	is	inexpensive	in	the	short‐term,	it	comes	with	high	risk	for	a	
large	corporation.	This	business‐as‐usual	approach	might	work	best	for	small,	less	
powerful	corporations	that	do	not	benefit	from	a	controversial	relationship	with	the	
primary	stakeholder	it	shares	with	the	controversial	issue.	If	a	company	is	small	and	
perceived	as	being	not	powerful	enough	to	make	any	changes,	there	is	a	low	likelihood	that	
this	company	becomes	a	boycott	target	in	the	first	place,	consistent	with	the	first	three	
factors	identified	in	the	last	section.	When	corporations	have	such	a	small	possibility	of	
becoming	victims	of	secondary	boycotts,	then	doing	nothing	might	actually	be	the	most	
cost‐effective	approach.			
Observer:	Regularly	Scanning	the	Environment	
	 The	second	option	for	corporations	is	to	regularly	scan	their	environment	for	the	
potential	of	secondary	boycotts.	These	scans	can	include	the	creation	of	issue‐focused	
stakeholder	maps	(see	Figure	2)	and	ongoing	dialogues	with	primary	stakeholders	to	
understand	the	issues	on	which	they	take	a	clear	position.	The	issue‐focused	stakeholder	
map	and	the	stakeholder	dialogues	will	enable	corporations	to	detect	potential	threats	and	
make	adjustments	where	necessary.		
  20
	 Continuously	scanning	the	broad	external	environment	for	threats	of	secondary	
boycotts	is	generally	consistent	with	Jones	et	al.’s	(2007)	instrumentalist	stakeholder	
culture.	While	the	corporation	might	forgo	some	short‐term	profits	given	its	investment	in	
scanning	the	environment	and	potential	secondary	boycott	threats,	this	approach	can	help	
to	avoid	future	losses	by	making	arrangements	to	quickly	drop	or	change	a	stakeholder	
who	is	involved	in	a	contentious	issue	the	firm	wishes	to	avoid.	Observing	and	scanning	the	
environment	for	all	potential	secondary	boycott	threats	is	done	out	of	self‐preservation.		
	 A	slightly	refined	implementation	of	this	approach	is	to	narrow	consideration	only	
to	those	issues	on	which	the	firm	has	explicitly	decided	to	take	a	stand.	Vulnerable	
corporations	are	advised	to	follow	this	approach,	as	this	is	consistent	with	its	good	CSR	
reputation	(consistent	with	the	fifth	factor).	Good	corporate	citizens	are	expected	to	
behave	well.	Observing	the	environment	and	thereby	identifying	specific	risks	is	consistent	
with	is	generally	consistent	with	a	stakeholder	culture	of	enlightened	self‐interest	(Jones	et	
al.,	2007).		
The	Neutral	Party:	Middle	of	The	Road	
A	third	approach	is	to	attempt	to	position	the	firm	on	both	sides	of	a	contentious	
societal	issue	by	spreading	the	firm’s	efforts	evenly	(i.e.	assembling	stakeholders	in	one’s	
network	who	represent	both	sides	of	the	issue).	We	call	this	approach	“middle	of	the	road.”	
By	supporting	both	sides,	the	company	might	try	to	offset	any	negative	attitudes	by	
referring	to	its	good	deeds.	So,	if	a	company	is	confronted	with	a	secondary	boycott,	it	could	
simply	jump	into	action	by	pointing	out	its	support	of	the	other	side,	too.	United	Utilities,	
for	instance,	could	rent	out	land	to	hunting	clubs,	but	financially	support	anti‐hunting	
groups.		
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While	this	approach	appears	to	create	harmony	and	avoid	bad	publicity	from	
secondary	boycotts,	it	has	severe	disadvantages.	First,	it	is	a	costly	approach,	as	the	
company	needs	to	allocate	resources	to	satisfying	a	variety	of	stakeholders	with	very	
diverse	positions.	Second,	it	is	dangerous	because	the	company	is	not	being	consistent	in	its	
own	behavior	and	values.	A	middle	of	the	road	approach	might	actually	do	more	harm	than	
good,	leading	to	a	loss	in	credibility.	When	a	company	is	confronted	with	a	secondary	
boycott	it	has	to	realize	that	there	might	not	be	a	middle	way	or	a	compromise.	There	is	no	
“we	are	a	bit	for	and	a	bit	against	gay	rights.”	J.C.	Penney	did	not	fall	into	the	trap	of	looking	
for	a	compromise	when	anti‐gay	groups	announced	their	secondary	boycott	against	the	
corporation	(Bruni,	2012).	The	company	kept	DeGeneres	as	its	spokesperson	and	stressed	
its	positive	attitude	towards	same	sex	couples	by	including	gay	couples	in	its	print	ads	
(Bruni,	2012).	
Target	did	not	adopt	a	middle	position	either.	Target	is	very	pro‐diversity	and	has	a	
history	that	reflects	an	excellent	relationship	with	the	gay	community.	The	donation	to	the	
pro‐business	group	supporting	candidate	Emmer	was	seen	as	inconsistent	with	Target’s	
values.	Target’s	CEO	used	his	apology	not	as	an	opportunity	to	try	to	take	a	middle	position,	
but	to	reaffirm	the	company’s	stance	on	the	importance	of	diversity.	
Given	this	reasoning,	a	position	in	the	middle	is	probably	not	an	advisable	long‐term	
approach,	as	the	company	might	not	be	perceived	as	authentic	or	consistent,	thereby	losing	
credibility.	As	in	private	life,	corporations	might	be	better	off	admitting	a	misjudgment	and	
engaging	in	corrective	action	rather	than	attempting	to	support	both	sides	of	an	issue.	
Collaborator:	Be	Part	of	The	Solution	
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	 The	opposite	extreme	from	the	do‐nothing	approach	(egoist)	is	to	actively	
collaborate	with	others	to	find	solutions	to	topical	issues.	The	idea	behind	this	approach	is	
to	engage	in	productive	dialogue	with	the	potential	initiators	of	secondary	boycotts	to	
understand	the	problem	and	get	ideas	for	potential	solutions.	A	solution	might	involve	
collaboration	among	several	stakeholders,	including	the	boycotted	one	and	the	prospective	
initiator	of	a	boycott.		
Corporations	with	a	moralist	stakeholder	culture	are	most	likely	to	follow	this	
approach	(Jones	et	al.,	2007).	A	moralist	stakeholder	culture	is	characterized	by	a	“concern	
for	all	stakeholders	and	adherence	to	principles	regardless	of	economic	temptations	to	
discard	them”	(Jones	et	al.,	2007,	149).	In	contrast	to	the	observer	who	is	driven	by	
enlightened	self‐interest,	the	collaborator	is	motivated	by	doing	good	and	finding	a	solution	
that	is	beneficial	to	all	stakeholders.		
Being	a	collaborator	and	participating	in	the	solution	is	most	advisable	and	most	
likely	to	be	successful	if	the	corporation	enjoys	power	within	its	stakeholder	network.	It	
does	not	matter	whether	this	power	originates	from	the	corporation’s	independence	of	its	
primary	stakeholders,	its	primary	stakeholders’	dependence	on	the	corporation,	or	its	
leverage	over	other	stakeholders.	Being	in	a	powerful	position	raises	the	demands	and	
expectations	of	secondary	stakeholders.	So,	powerful	corporations	that	are	confronted	with	
secondary	boycotts	might	face	even	more	criticism	if	they	do	nothing	as	they	are	perceived	
as	being	an	entity	that	can	affect	change.		
These	four	approaches	are	not	mutually	exclusive.	Although	the	egoist	approach	
(business	as	usual)	is	a	stand‐alone	strategy,	the	other	three	approaches	could	be	applied	
in	parallel.	A	corporation	could,	for	instance,	regularly	scan	its	environment	(observer).	If	it	
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gets	involved	in	a	secondary	boycott,	the	company	might	decide	to	actively	participate	in	
finding	a	solution	with	the	involved	parties	(collaborator).	In	a	similar	vein,	a	corporation	
can	regularly	scan	its	environment	and,	in	addition,	spread	its	stakeholder	management	
practices	to	please	every	stakeholder	(neutral	player).	If	the	corporation	then	becomes	a	
target	of	a	secondary	boycott,	it	might	decide	to	collaborate	with	the	parties	involved.	As	
previously	mentioned,	the	corporation	might	have	to	give	up	this	middle	of	the	road	
approach	at	one	point	because	it	might	cause	more	harm	than	good.	
IMPLICATIONS	FOR	MANAGERS	AND	BUSINESS	SCHOLARS	
	 Next	to	the	practical	implications	for	managers,	this	article	offers	an	extension	of	
stakeholder	theory.	We	contribute	to	the	existing	stakeholder	literature	by	proposing	an	
issue‐focused	stakeholder	map.	Also,	this	article	examines	a	phenomenon	that	has	become	
business	reality.	Corporations	are	increasingly	considered	as	being	part	of	issue‐focused	
stakeholder	maps,	thereby	bearing	a	responsibility	to	act.	While	this	article	extends	
stakeholder	theory	to	incorporate	secondary	boycotts,	we	abstain	from	any	normative	
discussion	about	their	legitimacy	or	morality,	leaving	these	topics	instead	to	future	
discussion.	Also	interesting	would	be	research	on	the	efficacy	of	secondary	boycotts.	Which	
factors	determine	whether	secondary	stakeholders	are	successful	in	triggering	the	focal	
corporation	to	act	according	to	their	demands?	
This	article	discusses	the	phenomenon	of	secondary	boycotts	and	provides	useful	
lessons	for	managers	and	scholars.	For	managers,	we	elaborate	on	their	vulnerability	of	
becoming	a	target	of	a	secondary	boycott.		We	provide	managers	with	some	guidance	on	
how	to	answer	questions	such	as	“how	are	we	connected	to	the	most	pressing	issues	in	our	
society	today?”	or	“how	can	we	contribute	to	solve	societal	issues?”	We	elaborate	on	the	
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likelihood	of	corporations	becoming	targets	of	secondary	boycotts	and	illustrate	how	
secondary	stakeholder	groups	might	choose	their	targets.	Also,	we	provide	some	guidance	
on	how	corporations	can	avoid	becoming	targets	of	secondary	boycotts	or	how	they	might	
react	if	they	are	boycotted.	
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Figure	1:	Traditional	Stakeholder	Map	
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Figure	2:	Issue‐focused	Stakeholder	Map			
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Figure	3:	Secondary	Boycott	
	
	
	
	
